We find that emerging markets appeared to be somewhat insulated from developments in U.S. financial markets from early 2007 to summer 2008. From that point on, however, emerging markets responded very strongly to the deteriorating situation in the U.S. financial system and real economy. Policy measures taken in emerging markets to insulate themselves from global financial developments proved inadequate in the face of the credit crunch and decline in international trade that followed the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008.
Introduction
In this paper we evaluate the transmission of the U.S. subprime crisis to emerging markets. Our interest in this topic is partly related to the widespread view that prior to the current crisis many emerging market countries had undertaken reforms that were designed to, and would in fact, insulate them from adverse shocks from the rest of the world. These policies included substantial increases in reserve assets and substantial reductions in net government debt. Moreover the currency exposure of EM governments was reduced in some cases to long dollar positions, commercial bank net foreign exchange borrowings were strictly limited and nonfinancial firms foreign currency debt was monitored and, in many cases, strictly controlled. Finally, emerging markets were generally experiencing current account and primary fiscal surpluses.
As recently as October 2008 the Mexican government argued forcefully that the Mexican economy was sufficiently insulated from the U.S. to get through the crisis without a significant recession.
1 More generally, the view that the emerging financial markets would not be directly affected by the subprime crisis suggested that growth in China and other emerging markets would carry the world economy for several years while the United States and Europe recovered. 2 These hopes evaporated quickly by fall 2008 and the question is did something about the U.S. crisis change or was the decoupling hypothesis too optimistic from the outset?
We address these questions empirically in several ways. In the next section we provide an informal narrative of the when, how and why emerging markets responded to the U.S.
subprime financial crisis. In this section we distinguish three phases of the financial crisis transmission to emerging markets. We argue that emerging market asset prices were largely insulated or decoupled from the crisis for some months, but then fell even harder than prices for US assets as expectations about GDP growth in the United States and other industrial countries deteriorated in the summer of 2008. Finally, the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 generated a very direct financial shock to emerging 1 Carstins (2008) 2 Bergsten (2008) , IMF (2008) .
markets as trade credit evaporated and international trade declined sharply and uniformly around the world. In section 3 we analyze formally how U.S. subprime "news" transmitted to CDS spreads in emerging markets 3 . We are interested in the types of "news" that moved CDS spreads, how common was the reaction across emerging markets, and in the magnitude of the response. 4 We identify events that others have claimed were important sources of information about the nature and intensity of the crisis for U.S. markets. We use one official data source (time line for important events published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis) and one market source (timeline for events published by Bloomberg) for these events. We distill these very detailed data sets into a set of 15 types of events that were thought to influence expectations in U.S.
markets. Using a regression "event study" approach, we test whether these U.S. events
were important in the evolution of debt (CDS spreads) in 14 selected emerging markets, if there was a common reaction across emerging markets, and the size of the response.
Our event study finds that a range of financial and real economic news emanating from the US has statistically and economically large impacts on emerging markets and several news events uniformly moved markets. However, it is not clear whether the structural linkages between the U.S. and emerging markets have changed or whether the frequency, importance and magnitude of the events emanating from the U.S. have changed. To address this "decoupling-recoupling" issue, in section 4 we review developments in selected equity, debt and foreign exchange markets for a sample of emerging market countries during the three phases of the financial crisis identified in our narrative description (beginning of 2007 (beginning of through February 2009 ). This analysis focuses on the 3 Credit-default swaps protect bondholders against default by paying the buyer face value in exchange for the underlying securities or the cash equivalent should a borrower fail to adhere to its debt agreements. The contracts rise as perceptions of credit quality deteriorate and a basis point is worth $1,000 on a contract protecting $10 million of debt.
4 Eichengreen et al. (2009) , in a related study, investigate the common factors influencing international bank CDS spreads during different phases of the subprime crisis. They find that the importance of common factors rose substantially after the outbreak of the subprime crisis. They employ principal component timeseries analysis rather than focus on news announcements emanating from the U.S. as in our event study. Longstaff et al. (2007) also finds that EM CDS spreads can mostly be explained by a global factor over the 2000-2007 period. timing of changes in these markets during the financial crisis for selected emerging markets relative to the U.S. and compares market dynamics. In section 5 we further address whether linkages changed or whether the frequency and magnitude of the shocks emanating from the U.S. changed. We focus on one emerging market with especially strong linkages with the U.S. economy-Mexico-and investigate the transmission of disturbances between equity markets and how they've changed between the different phases of the financial crisis. We conclude our discussion in section 6.
Our conclusion is that there is some support for the decoupling hypothesis through mid 2008. But as expectations for a severe downturn in economic activity in the U.S. and
Europe took hold and early warnings about the effects on world trade volumes took center stage, financial markets recoupled dramatically. Looking forward there is some support for the idea that emerging markets remain better prepared for less violent financial shocks from the rest of the world. Moreover it seems to us likely that they will redouble their efforts to insure against shocks.
Three Phases of the Subprime Crisis
In this section we provide an informal narrative of three phases of the transmission of the subprime crisis to the emerging markets. During the whole period reviewed, February A remarkable feature of this phase of the crisis was the apparent "decoupling" of credit and equity markets. As shown in Chart 2, spreads in EM and U.S. markets widened in phase 2 but, in contrast to equity markets, the deterioration in credit markets was very similar in magnitude.
Clearly something important changed several months before the Lehman bankruptcy sent all the markets into a new panic. The events that generated this very different intensity of sell offs are not easy to pinpoint. Nevertheless we think a good case can be made for the idea that this critical three-month interval leading up to Lehman was dominated by revised expectations about the real effects the crisis would have on output in industrial countries and emerging markets.
A remarkable feature of the macro data for the U.S. during phase 2 is that it gave no hint that a disaster was just around the corner. High frequency data for U.S. economic activity such as industrial production, exports and retail sales did not turn down until after There were, however, two sources of early warnings --both of which were probably responding to the same shift in expectations. First, commodity and oil prices also turned down sharply at the beginning of phase two. The fall in oil prices was good for some EMs and bad for others but we can probably relate the break in the oil market to changes in the outlook for world economic activity. The downturn in commodity prices was probably related to the same reduction in the outlook for world GDP growth and is clearly bad for EM equity and exchange rates.
Second, the similar increase in default spreads both in the U.S. and in emerging markets in phase 2 probably reflected expectations that what had to that point been a financial crisis in the U.S. and Europe could also turn into a long and deep decline in economic activity. The admission of the Federal Reserve on August 17 that "the downside risks to growth have increased appreciably" was an important and probably delayed acknowledgment of this shift in expectations.
Our interpretation of phase one and two is that during phase one emerging markets were plausibly decoupled from the financial crisis that was developing in the U.S. and Europe.
EM banks held very little subprime exposure and in most cases recent crises had led to very strict regulation of their banking systems. But in phase 2 there was no plausible reason to believe that emerging markets had decoupled from a potential collapse in economic activity in the U.S. and other industrial countries.
From Lehman Day to year end 2008, EM and U.S. equity markets fell together to levels forty percent below their pre-crisis levels. During this third phase of the crisis EM currencies also declined by about ten percent. EM and US credit spreads increased very sharply after September and by late October had reached crisis levels.
As discussed elsewhere in this issue, phase 3 was largely unanticipated and quite different as compared to phases one or two or any previous historical experience. In particular, the freezing of credit markets that reached crisis proportions with runs on U.S.
money market funds in late October appears to have had a direct effect on EM domestic credit markets. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that this freeze included international trade financing. 5 The contraction of world trade after September 2008 was remarkable both for its severity and for its uniformity across developed and emerging markets. Most countries saw a decline in both imports and exports of about 30% from September 2008 to January 2009.
One plausible explanation is that in the post-Lehman phase even trade credit to support exports and imports was disrupted by the counter party risk and deleveraging generated by the bankruptcy of a major player in international credit markets. If this was indeed the case then the third phase of the crisis was a spectacular recoupling of financial markets in the U.S. and emerging markets. An optimistic interpretation of developments in 2009 is that as U.S. financial markets have unfrozen there is some hope that recovery of world trade will support economic recovery programs in industrial countries and emerging markets.
Transmission of U.S. Real and Financial Shocks to Emerging Markets
We now turn to daily data for news from the United States and debt, equity and exchange rates in emerging markets. In this section we focus on daily CDS spreads (5-year sovereign bonds) in 14 selected emerging markets, and regress changes in these spreads on a host of financial, real and political news announcements that have emanated from the U.S. since the beginning of 2007 through early 2009. Our objective is to evaluate which types of announcements have the most effect on emerging markets, evaluate the magnitude of these events, and identify those shocks which uniformly appear to move markets.
A. Data

CDS Spreads in Emerging Markets
5 The link between trade credit and trade during the subprime and previous financial crises is far from clear. We consider this a plausible conjecture. See IMF (2003), Auboin and Moritz Meier-Ewert (2008) .
Our objective is to evaluate how financial markets in emerging markets respond to U.S. 
U.S. Financial and Real "News" Events
Our other key data component is U.S. "news" events. For the purposes of this study it is important that we capture major news announcements emanating primarily from the U.S.
market and test which of these events transmit to emerging markets. We want to cast our net widely over a broad set of news announcements but no so widely as to include events of marginally important information value.
We consider the Bloomberg news announcements on the U.S. economy and the financial (REALPLUS) and negative economic developments in the U.S. (REALMINUS). Table 1 gives a more detailed explanation of the description and coding of the events as well as illustrative examples of events included in each category. Table 2 shows the number of events in each category for the full sample (total number of events) and for two sub-sample periods-the combined first and second phases of financial problems that 
B. Methodology and Results
The dependent variable that we wish to explain is the daily change in the CDS spread for each emerging market of our sample. Unit root tests suggest that the change in the CDS spread is a stationary variable. In addition to the "news" variables and a constant, we also are also associated with lower CDS spreads in emerging markets in 13 instances, of which 7 coefficients are statistically significant. Argentina is again the exception.
Three types of news announcements in the U.S. which surprisingly did not uniformly play a role in emerging market CDS spreads were major policy actions taken by the U.S.
Treasury and Federal Reserve to shore up the financial system (TBS, FBS and REG).
These events attracted much news attention but did not generally transmit to emerging markets. In particular, CDS spreads in only three of the eleven countries were significantly reduced by TBS announcements (Brazil, Mexico and Turkey) . Surprisingly, CDS spreads rose significantly in response to FBS announcements in China and
Malaysia--presumably providing bad news to the market about the extent of the liquidity problems facing U.S. banks and credit markets rather than good news about the Fed program--and were not significantly affected elsewhere. 6 Similarly, important changes in financial system regulations (REG) lowered spreads significantly in only one case (Chile) and significantly raised spreads in four cases. 
Equity Prices
The behavior of levels of broad stock indices is shown in Second, in late May 2008, the equity markets again start to move together. In the next section we will show that this was associated with increasing expectations that the decline in economic activity would be much larger than had been anticipated. This close relationship is even more pronounced in mid September when the Lehman crisis proceeds a spectacular fall in all the markets through mid October. In the next section we will look for news associated with these broad trends but for now it seems clear that something important occurred in June-July 2008 and again in September 2008.
Finally in the first three months of this year extreme volatility continues and markets have moved together but with no clear trend as of this writing.
In terms of the net move over the whole time period there does not seem to be any pattern. If we look at the whole sample, Brazil and China outperform the U.S. by substantial margins. The volatility of equity prices is much higher for Brazil and China as compared to the U.S. and, as we discuss in more detail below, the day-to-day correlation for Brazil is quite high and for China quite low. Can we draw any conclusions about the interdependence of these markets? It could be argued that Brazil and China are completely integrated with the U.S. market and subject to the same shocks but are more volatile. Clearly if this pattern was reliable it would be trivial to mimic any market by another by adjusting the leverage to increase or reduce volatility.
One additional summary statistic useful for shedding light on this issue is correlations between price movements (percentage changes) in these markets, and how they've changed over time 8 . Table 4 
Credit markets
Chart 4 shows daily credit default spreads for the U.S. and selected emerging markets.
The similarity of the changes and timing in the CDS spreads across emerging markets over the period is remarkable. Also there was almost no movement in CDS spreads until the Lehman failure. Only in a very tough environment would governments be expected to default. Clearly the Lehman bankruptcy was a different kind of problem and it was transmitted across all kind of countries in remarkably similar ways.
Volatility also appears to take a distinct shift upwards starting around mid-September 2008 (phase 3). Again, the same pattern of initial decoupling from the bad financial news emanating from the U.S. is evident until late summer 2008. However, hopes that emerging markets were decoupled from the financial crisis and that their economies would be insulated were dashed by early fall 2008.
Exchange rates
Exchange rate developments for selected emerging markets (Mexico, Argentina and Russia) are shown in Chart 5. Exchange rates follow a similar general pattern to equity prices in that they generally appreciated relative to the dollar, at times rapidly, until that market forces were moving these markets apart for the early part of the sample (phases 1 and 2) and then linkages reemerged in the latter part (phase 3) of the sample; or (2) news announcements emanating from the U.S. were more frequent, and were more important for emerging markets in the later sample compared to the early sample.
These are not necessarily competing hypotheses. Clearly, the worst financial and economic news emanating from the U.S. was concentrated in the period from early fall 2008 (post-Lehman) onwards. However, it also appears that emerging markets were more sensitive to U.S. news announcements in the latter part of the sample. To shed further light on the decoupling hypothesis, we investigate the linkage between the U.S. equity market and the Mexican equity market. 9 We investigate how these markets are linked using a simple VAR model, Granger-causality tests and impulse response functions for the two sub-sample periods. Differences in the estimates between the two periods, 1/07 to 8/08 for the early period (phases 1 and 2) and 9/08 to 2/09 for the late period (phase 3), should highlight differences in the responsiveness of daily percent changes in Mexican equity prices and daily percent changes in U.S. equity prices.
We employ a simple bivariate VAR model with U.S. and Mexican equity prices and three lagged values. Equity prices are in log first differences to ensure that stationary series are employed in the VAR model. Three lags are indicated by most of the lag length statistical tests shown in Table 5 . Table 6 shows part of the Granger causality tests for each sample period, namely the effect of lagged percent changes in U.S. equity prices (SP500) on percent changes in Mexican equity prices. The upper panel shows the full sample period (all three phases of the subprime crisis), the middle panel shows phases 1 and 2 of the crisis and lower panel shows phase 3 of the crisis.
The Granger causality results for the full sample (upper panel) indicate a strong linkage between the U.S. equity market and the Mexican equity market. The null hypothesis that 9 One empirical approach would be to divide our sample into two parts and test for structural change in the responsiveness of emerging markets to news emanating from the U.S. We cannot follow this approach, however, due to the relative paucity of news announcements in the first sub-sample period.
U.S. equity prices do not "Granger cause" Mexican equity prices is rejected at the 1% level. This simply means that lagged values of the U.S. equity prices are a good leading indicator of Mexican equity prices (in percentage changes) over the full sample. In the early sample period representing phases 1 and 2 of the crisis, by contrast, U.S. equity prices add no (statistically significant) information in predicting Mexican equity prices.
Phase 3 of the crisis suggests that U.S. equity prices are marginally significant (12% level of significance) predictors of Mexican equity prices. There appears to be more information available over the full sample period to make the judgment that U.S. equities are a good leading indicator of Mexican equities, but this information appears to be derived mainly from the period encompassing the third phase of the crisis (post-Lehman).
This again provides some evidence of the "decoupling" hypothesis for phases 1 and 2 of the crisis with linkages reemerging during the third phase of the crisis.
This observation is supported by impulse response functions derived from the 3-lag bivariate VAR model which underlie the Granger causality results of Table 6 It is clear that U.S. financial and real news transmitted strongly to emerging markets over the whole sample period, as reflected in 5-year CDS spreads on sovereign bonds. We identified a wide set of U.S. news announcements such as write-downs of financial institutions and news on the U.S. real economy that systemically moved CDS spreads in most emerging markets. We also identified several types of news announcements, such as 
